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Fixing Baker Botts: Contractual Provisions Granting an Exception to the American Rule in
Bankruptcy
Sarah Jones*
I.

Introduction

Two law firms have sought the Delaware Bankruptcy Court’s approval under § 328 of the
Bankruptcy Code for contractual provisions in engagement letters granting attorneys fees for
successfully defended fee applications.1 The reason for such provisions takes root from the
Supreme Court’s holding in Baker Botts v. Asarco.2 In the case Baker Botts, the petitioner had
represented ASARCO, a corporation with over $10 billion in debt, in bankruptcy, including
prosecuting ASARCO’s parent company, Grupo Mexico, for fraudulent transfer.3 Baker Botts
accomplished what the trial court judge proclaimed “the most successful Chapter 11 of any
magnitude in the history of the [Bankruptcy] Code.”4 Baker Botts obtained a judgment against
Grupo Mexico worth over $7 billion and, four years after filing bankruptcy, ASARCO found itself
“with $1.4 billion in cash, little debt, and resolution of its environmental liabilities.”5 Baker Botts
filed an application requesting fees for its services under section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code. 6
After the successful reorganization, ASARCO fell back into the control of Grupo Mexico,
the parent company ASARCO had sued in Baker Botts v. ASARCO, for the $7 billion. The
reorganized ASARCO then began a “scorched earth campaign” to object to Baker Botts’ fee
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1
Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015).
2
In Re Northshore Mainland Services, Inc. No. 15-11402-KJC (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 14, 2015); In Re Boomerang
Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW, (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015).
3
In re ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2011 WL 2974957, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part and remanded, 477 B.R. 661 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
4
Id. (“Creditors were expected to receive cents on the dollar, if anything, because ASARCO's assets were severely
depleted and the claims against it were extraordinarily high.”).
5
Id.
6
In re ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2011 WL 2974957, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011).
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applications.7 After Baker Botts successfully defended itself against these objections, which the
trial court held as meritless,8 Baker Botts requested compensation for its defense costs by an
exception to the American Rule, a Bankruptcy custom accepted in the majority of jurisdictions.9
The district court approved the fees, but the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court denied them on
appeal.10 The Supreme Court declared that section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code did not include
express language indicating an exception to the American Rule for bankruptcy attorneys; therefore,
bankruptcy attorneys could not collect attorney’s fees for successfully defending fee
applications.11
The majority of courts had previously reasoned that rewarding fees for successfully
defending fee applications furthered the “market based” approach Congress adopted as the policy
of section 330: to compensate bankruptcy professionals in parity with their non-bankruptcy
counterparts.12 Unlike in ordinary corporate contexts, under Chapter 11 bankruptcy law, a number
of parties can object to an attorney’s compensation.13 Each party’s objection puts the bankruptcy
attorney in the predicament of facing one of two losses: either cutting the fees or incurring the cost
of defending the fee application.14 Despite the fact that bankruptcy professionals are fairly

7

Brief for Petitioners, 35–36m Baker Botts L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC, 2014 WL 6845689 (2014).
See id.
9
Timothy S. Springer, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t – Current Issues for Professionals Seeking
Compensation in Bankruptcy Cases Under 11 U.S.C. § 330, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 539 (2013).
10
Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015).
11
Id. at 2164 (“We have recognized departures from the American Rule only in ‘specific and explicit provisions for
the allowance of attorneys' fees under selected statutes’…[and] congress did not expressly depart from the American
Rule to permit compensation for fee-defense litigation by professionals hired to assist trustees in bankruptcy
proceedings.”) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975)).
12
3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH (“Attorneys and other professionals serving in a bankruptcy case are to
be compensated at the same rate that would be used to compensate them for performing comparable services in
nonbankruptcy cases.”). See Springer, supra note 9, at 539 (“The courts supporting the success rule follow similar
policy arguments to those pre-dating the 1994 Amendments-namely, the equal pay concept that not granting defense
costs would "dilute fee awards" below compensation available to attorneys generally.”).
13
11 U.S.C.A. § 1109 (2005) (“A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity
security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise [a fee
objection.]”).
14
Springer, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Brief for Amici Curiae Bankruptcy Law Scholars in Support
of Petitioners, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC, 3, 2014 WL 7145500 (2014) (“Most lawyers, of course, are not in
8
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compensated,15 fee objections are frequently litigated.16 Bankruptcy courts, wary that defense
costs would dilute fee compensation below the market rate, allowed attorney compensation for
successfully defending applications.17 Under the majority system, creditors and debtors were
incentivized to limit objections to those with merit and professionals were compensated in a
manner that furthered the policy of the statute.18
This Comment argues that Baker Botts does not destroy market driven compensation the
way some have feared.19 The American Rule has two exceptions: by contractual provision and by
statute.20 This note argues that while Baker Botts may have denied the first option under section
330,21 the holding still leaves bankruptcy professionals another road to market rate compensation:
contractual provisions in retention agreements made under section 328.22 While some have argued
that other methods are sufficient to alleviate concerns regarding fee dilution,23 this Comment will

the position of having to litigate the reasonableness of their fees with anyone other than the client that engaged them,
much less multiple adversaries of that client.”).
15
See Stephen Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional
Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509, 512 (2000) (“Chapter 11 is substantially less expensive
than other significant corporate transactions.”).
16
Amicus Curiae Brief of the State Bar of Texas Bankruptcy Law Section in Support of Petitioners, Baker Botts L.L.P.
v. Asarco LLC, 19, 2014 WL 7145502 (2014) (citing Presentation of the Landmark ABI Fee Study: Conclusions and
Ramifications 8, ¶¶ 15-16 (American Bankruptcy Institute, Winter Leadership Conference 2007); Stephen J. Lubben
(Reporter), Chapter 11 Professional Fee Study 35 (American Bankruptcy Institute, 2007)).
17
See Springer, supra note 9.
18
Id.
19
David Bury, 20 Questions about Baker Botts v. ASARCO & “Fee-Defense” Costs – Part 2, PLAN PROPONENT, (July
14, 2015), http://www.planproponent.com/20-questions-about-baker-botts-v-asarco-fee-defense-costs-part-2/.
20
Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2164 (“‘Each litigant pays his own attorney's fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract
provides otherwise.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53
(2010)).
21
Id. at 2169.
22
See In Re Northshore Mainland Services, Inc. No. 15-11402-KJC (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 14, 2015); In Re Boomerang
Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW, (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015); Stephen J. Lubben, Problems With the Supreme
Court’s
Ruling
on
Fees,
N,
Y.
TIMES:
DEALBOOK
(Sept.
4,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/business/dealbook/problems-with-supreme-courts-ruling-on-fees.html; Jeffrey
S. Sabin, The Baker Botts v. Asarco Fallout Has Begun, LAW360 (Sept. 1, 2015, 12:49 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/697291/the-baker-botts-v-asarco-fallout-has-begun.
23
See supra Sec. C.
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demonstrate that contractual provisions are the only sufficient method to fulfill congressional
policy and maintain the success of chapter 11 bankruptcy.
This note will begin in Part II by summarizing section 330’s legislative history and policy,
and the judicial history of defending fee applications. Next, it will explain the Baker Botts ruling
and the American Rule. Part III will argue why court-approved defense fee provisions under
section 328 comply with Baker Botts and why such provisions are necessary under the Code’s
market-based policy. Fee defense provisions not only comply with section 328, but they also are
the most suitable among all of the options raised to compensate bankruptcy professionals on par
with their non-bankruptcy counterparts.

Finally, applying the factors applied to retention

agreements drafted under section 328, courts should find fees for defense of fee provisions
reasonable.
II. From the Spirit of the Economy to the Market Based Approach: The Evolution of
Compensation
Two schools of thought, the market based and the spirit of the economy, chronicle
bankruptcy law’s philosophy.24

The current Bankruptcy Code employs the market-based

approach.25 Under this framework, a bankruptcy attorney is paid in parity with her non-bankruptcy
counterparts since she is compensated at the same rate as an attorney of comparable skill,
reputation, and experience.26 The Bankruptcy Act governed bankruptcy law until the Bankruptcy
Code was enacted in 1978.27 Under the Bankruptcy Act, courts set attorneys fees under the spirit
of economy approach.28 The spirit of the economy’s priority was to protect the funds of the

24

3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH.
Id.
26
Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988); see id.
27
3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH.
28
Id.
25
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estate.29 As a result, attorney fees were severely limited to the least reasonable,30 if not the lowest
minimum,31 possible.
While the spirit of the economy approach was intended to protect the estate, lawmakers
grew concerned that the policy caused the opposite effect.32 If bankruptcy professionals were paid
less than their non-bankruptcy counterparts, it was likely that skilled attorneys were incentivized
to practice elsewhere.33 To illustrate the pay gap, bankruptcy attorneys’ fees nearly doubled after
1978 in order meet the market-based approach.34 Unlike the prominent and strategic role
bankruptcy practice holds today, bankruptcy professionals were locked out of the corporate world,
and elite firms shunned bankruptcy practice as undignified work.35 Congress, wary that the the
future of the practice would only “be occupied by those who could not find other work and those
who practice bankruptcy law only occasionally almost as a public service,” decided to implement
the market based approach under section 330.36
In drafting section 330, the legislature stated that “[a]ttorneys . . . serving in a bankruptcy
case are to be compensated at the same rate that would be used to compensate them for performing

29

Id.
Id.; see, e.g. Jacobowitz v. Double Seven Corp., 378 F.2d 405, 408 (9th Cir. 1967) (setting attorney fees “at the
lower end of the spectrum for reasonableness”).
31
3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH.; see, e.g. In re Lng, 127 F. 755, 757 (W.D. Tex. 1904) (reducing fees
to the “lowest minimum possible”).
32
H.R. REP. 95-595, 30, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6286; 24 Cong. Rec. H11,091-2 (Sept. 28, 1978); reprinted in
App. Pt. 4(f)(i) infra; 124 Cong. Rec. S17,408 (Oct. 6, 1978), reprinted in App. Pt. 4(f)(iii) infra.
33
Id.
34
Elliot D. Lee, “Bankruptcy Lawyers Gain Status, Wider Role in Corporate Strategy,” WALL ST. J., July 9, 1987, at
31.
35
Id.; KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 152 (1997) (“Indeed, most professionals wish to avoid a return to
the time when bankruptcy law practice was not well regarded and was considered by most firms as unseemly, like
family law or criminal law. The quality and professionalism of the bankruptcy bar have risen since then.”) (citing
Lynn M. LoPucki, “The Demographics of Bankruptcy Practice,” 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 289 (1989)).
36
11 U.S.C.A. § 330 (1978); H.R. REP. 95-595, 30, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6286; see also 124 Cong. Rec. 32, 394
(1978) (“[T]he policy of [the section] is to compensate attorneys and other professionals serving in a case under title
11 at the same rate as the attorney or other professional would be compensated for performing comparable
services[.]”); 3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH; Lee, supra note 34, at 31 ("We intended to make it easier
for companies to file for reorganization and easier for the bankruptcy bar to attract better-qualified lawyers[.]") (Frank
R. Kennedy) (executive director of the federal commission that recommended most of the changes adopted in the
1978 Act).
30
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comparable services in non-bankruptcy cases.”37 The new market-based approach, combined with
the other changes of the Code, such as increased accessibility to bankruptcy protection, allowed
bankruptcy professionals to gain status and a wider role in corporate decisionmaking. 38 They
became corporations’ special advisors and strategists for “life or death situation[s].”39 By 1987,
bankruptcy attorneys had shed their “dirty collar” reputation and joined some of the nation’s most
elite law firms.40 The new system has proven to be fruitful for debtors, creditors, and attorneys
alike, evidenced by the fact that modern bankruptcy attorneys have orchestrated some of the most
successful reorganizations in bankruptcy’s history.41
The Bankruptcy Code and section 330 have been modified over time, but the market-based
approach has continued to be documented within its statutes.42 The 1978 version of section 330(a)
stated that compensation is “based on the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, the
time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services other than in a case under [the
Code].”43 In 1994, the legislature also added the Johnson factors to aid courts in determining
reasonable compensation, finalizing section 330(a) to the version it is today. 44 The Johnson
Factors entail: (a) time spent on services; (b) rates charged for such services; (c) whether the

3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH; see also 124 Cong. Rec. 32, 394 (1978) (“[T]he policy of [the section]
is to compensate attorneys and other professionals serving in a case under title 11 at the same rate as the attorney or
other professional would be compensated for performing comparable services[.]”).
38
Lee, supra note 34, at 31; see also Richard I. Aaron, The Bankruptcy Bench, 89 COM. L.J. 47, 47 (1984) (“Insolvency
practice enjoys a prestige marked by contrast to that of a few years ago. Firms which disdained the work now eagerly
seek the business.”).
39
Lee, supra note 34, at 31.
40
Lee, supra note 34, at 31; GROSS, supra note 35, at 152.
41
Stewart Bishop, Lehman Brothers Creditors Getting $2.2B Payout, LAW360, (Feb. 19, 2015, 6:42 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/623015/lehman-brothers-creditors-getting-2-2b-payout; Trefis Team, Relaunching
American Airlines's Coverage: Exiting Bankruptcy Into A Successful Turnaround Has Added Value, FORBES (May
12, 2014, 01:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/05/12/relaunching-american-airlinesscoverage-exiting-bankruptcy-into-a-successful-turnaround-has-added-value/#2f8814104b81; see also In re
ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2011 WL 2974957, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011) (calling the case “the
most successful Chapter 11 of any magnitude in the history of the [Bankruptcy] Code.”).
42
3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH.
43
11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1978) (emphasis added).
44
3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH.
37
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services were necessary or beneficial to the case at the time they were rendered; (d) whether the
services were completed within a reasonable period of time given the importance, complexity, and
nature of the problem; (e) whether the person has bankruptcy skills and experience; and (f)
“whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by
comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.”45
A. Actual and Necessary Services
Under section 330, attorneys may receive compensation for “actual, necessary services”
that are found reasonable under the Johnson Factors.46 Actual and necessary services are “those
services that aid the professional's client in fulfilling its duties under the Code.”47 For example, if
an attorney represents the committee, his services may aid the client in investigating the debtor’s
conditions and plans, formulating plans, and other duties proscribed under the Code.48 An attorney
representing the trustee may aid the client in investigating the financial affairs of the debtor,
monitoring the business if it is still in operation, and ensuring the debtor performs all duties
proscribed under the Code.49 While it comported with common sense that assisting clients in their
duties classified as “actual, necessary” services payable under section 330, other services, such as
preparing fee applications or defending such fee applications, were frequently disputed.50
A fee application is a thorough statement of a bankruptcy attorney’s rates and time spent
on services for a given case.51 Courts were split on whether preparing fee applications, no less

45

11 U.S.C. § 330 (1994) (emphasis added).
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) (1994).
47
In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 140 B.R. 482, 485 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
48
11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1984).
49
11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2010).
50
See, e.g. In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985) (allowing compensation for preparing and
defending fee applications); In re Jessee, 77 B.R. 59 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987) (declining to award compensation for
defending fee applications); In re Courson, 138 B.R. 928 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992) (declining to allow compensation
for preparing and defending fee applications).
51
See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(a).
46
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defending such applications, were necessary services under section 330. 52 Applications require a
great deal of care and detail because the attorney must prove that the compensation is a fair market
rate.53 In the 1994 amendment. Congress partially addressed these issues by adding subsection
(a)(6) to 330, which orders that “compensation awarded for the preparation of a fee application
[shall] be based on the level and skill reasonably required to prepare the application.”54 This
provision demonstrated that preparing fee applications was a necessary service for the purposes of
the statute, but remained silent as to the defense of such fee applications.55
Courts were split as to whether defending fee application were actual and necessary
services under section 330.56 The majority, led by the Ninth Circuit, held that such litigation fees
should be payable if the attorney was successful in defending the fee application.57 The minority
held that the estate should never pay for defense fees.58
B. The Majority Approach

52

See In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655 (allowing compensation for preparing and defending fee applications);
In re Jessee, 77 B.R. 59 (declining to award compensation for defending fee applications); In re Courson, 138 B.R.
928 (declining to allow compensation for preparing and defending fee applications).
53
See Bankruptcy Fee Applications: Compensable Service or Cost of Doing Business, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1327,
1327 n. 7 (1990); see also Butenas, Establishing Attorney's Fees Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 37 Bus. Law. 77,
83 (1981) (advising attorneys to extensively document every hour of work and to be prepared that compensation and
services may be objected).
54
11 U.S.C. §330(a)(6) (1994); GRANT W. NEWTON, BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACCOUNTING, PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 454 (7th ed., Volume 1, 2009).
55
See generally 11 U.S.C. §330 (1994).
56
Springer, supra note 9, at 535, n. 69–70 (citing In re Manoa Fin., 853 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing
compensation); Frazin v. Haynes & Boone, LLP (In re Frazin), 413 B.R. 378, 402–03 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009)
(denying compensation), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, and remanded, 723 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2013)
(denying compensation); In re Hers Cosmetics Corp., 114 B.R. 240, 244 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (allowing
compensation); In re DN Assocs., 165 B.R. 344, 354–55 (Bankr. D. Me. 1994) (denying compensation); Boyd v.
Engman, 404 B.R. 467, 483 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (allowing compensation); In re Teraforce Tech. Corp., 347 B.R. 838,
866-67 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (denying compensation); In re JNS Aviation, LLC, No. 04-21055-RLJ-7, 2009 WL
80202, at *9 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009) (denying compensation); ASARCO LLC v. Baker Botts, L.L.P. (In re
ASARCO LLC), 477 B.R. 661, 675 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (allowing compensation); Nunley v. Jessee, 92 B.R. 152, 154
(W.D. Va. 1988) (allowing compensation)).
57
Id.
58
Id.
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Prior to Baker Botts,59 the majority of courts held that successfully defending fee
applications were actual and necessary services under section 330.60 The reasoning behind the
majority view can be traced to opinions long before the 1994 amendment to the code, such as In
re Nucorp Energy.61 Following the 1994 amendment, courts determined that, as a matter of
fairness and in furtherance of section 330’s market-based policy, successful defense costs were
necessary to the bankruptcy system as a whole.62
In 1985, In re Nucorp set forth the majority’s policy perspective regarding defense fees.63
The Ninth Circuit first determined which services are comparable to bankruptcy counsels’ for
purposes of the statute.64 If the services were comparable to services with fees expressly provided
for by statute, the compensation should have been allowed. 65 For policy reasons, statutory fee
award provisions are read to approve compensation for defending fees. However, if the services
were comparable to situations in which the attorneys benefit the entire class of litigants through a
common fund, then compensation would not be allowed under the “fund doctrine.”66
The court found that, given the special nature of the source of fees in bankruptcy,
bankruptcy was not directly comparable to either of the categories. 67 However, the policies
underlying bankruptcy and other statutory fee provisions were so similar that compensation was
fairly warranted.68 The issue with the common fund comparison was the fact that, while attorney

59

Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015).
See Springer, supra note 9, at 535.
61
764 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985).
62
Springer, supra note 56, at 538–41.
63
See In re Smith, 305 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing In Re Nucorp, 764 F.2d at 660–61).
64
In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 655–61 (9th Cir. 1985).
65
Id. at 659–61.
66
Id. at 661 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975); City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1094, 1098 (2d Cir. 1977); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 110 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc)).
67
Id. at 662.
68
Id.
60
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fees are derived from the common pool of the estate, this was not a common fund created by the
attorney and benefiting the entire class. The estate existed as the source of compensation to begin
with. While the source of fees in bankruptcy cases is not the same as in statutory fee cases either,
the underlying policy concerns are similar. Bankruptcy and other statutory fee provisions share
two common policies: maintaining fair market rates for services, which may be affected by
dilution, and encouraging attorneys to practice in the field, which may be affected by decreased
rates. Dilution is the concern that “the attorney’s effective rate for all the hours expended on the
case will be correspondingly decreased.”69 The court reasoned, if attorney fees are diluted, then
attorneys will not take bankruptcy cases, thus defeating the Code’s goal to encourage
representation.70
The courts that followed In Re Nucrop’s reasoning sought to protect bankruptcy fees, and
thus protect the quality of bankruptcy work, by counteracting the fee dilution created by fee
objections.71

Despite the fact that bankruptcy professionals are fairly compensated, 72 fee

objections are frequently litigated.73 Every time a party objects, the bankruptcy attorney is forced
to either cut her fees or incur the cost of defending a fee application; either way her fees are
effectively diluted.74 To counteract fee dilution, the majority of bankruptcy courts awarded

69

Id. at 660 (citing Prandini v. Nat'l Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1978)).
Id.
71
In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985).
72
Stephen Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees
in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509, 512 (2000) (“Chapter 11 is substantially less expensive than
other significant corporate transactions.”).
73
Amicus Curiae Brief of the State Bar of Texas Bankruptcy Law Section in Support of Petitioners, 19, Baker Botts
L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC, 2014 WL 7145502 (2014) (citing Presentation of the Landmark ABI Fee Study: Conclusions
and Ramifications 8, ¶¶ 15–16 (American Bankruptcy Institute, Winter Leadership Conference 2007); Stephen J.
Lubben (Reporter), Chapter 11 Professional Fee Study 35 (American Bankruptcy Institute, 2007)).
74
Springer, supra note 56; Brief for Amici Curiae Bankruptcy Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners, Baker Botts
L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC, 3, 2014 WL 7145500 (2014) (“Most lawyers, of course, are not in the position of having to
litigate the reasonableness of their fees with anyone other than the client that engaged them, much less multiple
adversaries of that client.”).
70
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attorneys compensation for successfully defending applications.75 Under such a system, creditors
and debtors were incentivized to limit objections to those with merit, and professionals were
compensated in a manner that furthered the policy of the statute.76
The Ninth Circuit further articulated the majority approach in 2002.77 In Re Smith held
that a court did not err in err in granting attorneys fees for successfully defending a fee
application.78 The court held that the express language of section 330 did not prohibit granting
such attorneys fees, and granting compensation for defense fees would in fact comport with section
330’s requirements.79 The court recognized that if it were to deny the plaintiff “reasonable
compensation for successfully defending its fee awards would dilute its compensation for ‘actual
and necessary services.’”80 Thus, for the purposes of section 330(a), the defense fees were
necessary to the bankruptcy system as a whole, and consequentially to the case at hand.81 Some
courts grew concerned that compensation would encourage meritless fee requests and subsequent
litigation fees when such requests were objected.82 However, because the In Re Smith holding was
limited to successful fee defenses, the Ninth Circuit held that meritless fee requests would not be
an issue.83
B. Baker Botts and the American Rule
In 2015, the Supreme Court overruled the majority approach by holding that, due the
American Rule, section 330 did not recognize defense fees. The American Rule is the “bedrock

75

See Springer, supra note 56, at 539.
See Springer supra note 56, at 539–40.
77
Smith v. Edwards & Hale, Ltd. (In re Smith), 317 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Lamie
v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 531–39 (2004).
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 929.
81
Id.
82
In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co., 945 F.2d 320, 323 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co., 111
B.R. 298, 301 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990)).
83
Id.
76
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principle” which requires that: “‘[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a
statute or contract provides otherwise.’”84 In the case, Baker Botts did not have a contract
expressly granting defense fees, but applied for the court to approve its fees under section 330.
The Court took a textualist approach: Congress included no express provision for bankruptcy fees
in section 330, such as it had done for preparing fee applications, therefore no exception could be
inferred.85 In dicta, the Court questioned the market-based policy supporting defense fees, but
ultimately held that even if the decision would “‘undercut a basic objective of the statute,’” the
absence of express language ruled the day.86 An array of bankruptcy experts, including scholars,
judges, neutral fee examiners, and professional organizations, supported Baker Botts as Amici
Curiae.87 They all agreed that, based on the market-based approach, denying compensation for fee
applications would be an unfit dilution of fees below the general market value.88
In Baker Botts, the Supreme Court declined to follow the majority rule. Applying the
American Rule to Section 330, the Court determined that, because section 330 did not contain an
express provision granting defense fees, such fees may not be granted.89 The Court held that
defense fees are not statutorily granted under section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code, and thus do not
fall within the express statute or contract exception to the American Rule.90 The court reasoned

84

Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
Co., 560 U. S. 242, 252–53 (2010)).
85
Id. at 2169.
86
Id.; see also Stephen J. Lubben, Problems With the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Fees, N. Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Sept. 4, 2015, time?), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/business/dealbook/problems-with-supreme-courtsruling-on-fees.html (“[T]he opinion does suggest that the Supreme Court does not really understand the dynamics of
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that under the American Rule, “‘[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a
statute or contract provides otherwise.’”91 Baker Botts, supported by a lengthy list of amici curiae
including bankruptcy scholars, judges, neutral fee examiners, and professional organizations,
argued that the policy and purpose of the current Bankruptcy Code is to compensate bankruptcy
attorneys on par with other attorneys performing comparable services, and that such a ruling would
dilute bankruptcy attorneys’ fees below the general market value. 92 The Court, emphasizing its
strict adherence to the traditional application of the American Rule, ruled that section 330 does not
create an express exception to the American Rule, thus the defense awards would not be granted
“even if doing so [would] . . . ‘undercut a basic objective of the statute.’”93
III. Court Approved Fee Defense Provisions Under Section 328
A number of bankruptcy practices have responded to Baker Botts by incorporating fee
defense provisions in their retention agreements with creditors and debtors alike.94 Under the
Bankruptcy Code, professionals may make fee requests with the court quantum meruit at the end
of the case under section 330, or they may alternatively have the court preapprove retention
agreements under an entirely separate section, section 328.95 Firms make the argument that, while

91

Id. at 2164 (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U. S. 242, 252–53 (2010).
Brief for Petitioners at 35–36, Baker Botts, 2014 WL 6845689.
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In Re Northshore Mainland Services, Inc., No. 15-11402-KJC (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 14, 2015) (representing official
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Creditors, In Re Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW, (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015); Fola Akinnibi,
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Scott Flaherty, Baker Botts Angles to Shield Future Fees After Asarco Ruling, AM. LAWYER (Dec. 31, 2015),
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11 U.S.C. §§ 328, 330 (2005); see generally, ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
¶ 330.03 (16th ed. 2015)
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(“Under the Bankruptcy Act, compensation was awarded only upon a quantum meruit basis as determined
by the court. Thus, the trustee did not have the power to enter into compensation arrangements with
professionals employed by the trustee. Section 328(a) gives to the trustee authority to agree to any
reasonable compensation arrangements with professional persons.”).
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section 330 does not include language consenting to fees for defense of fees, section 328 allows
attorneys to draft contracts with fee defense provisions.96 So long as the court approves the
contracts as reasonable, they are valid.97 Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Baker Botts,
contractual arrangements are an exception to the American Rule.98
The bankruptcy firms’ stance has been met with some opposition.99 The U.S. Trustee,
Andrew Vara, has taken the opposing position that such provisions are strictly precluded under
Baker Botts.100 Furthermore, in the recent opinion for In Re Boomerang, one bankruptcy court for
the District of Delaware recently determined that Baker Botts forbids such provisions as well.101
The arguments proclaimed by both the U.S. Trustee and the bankruptcy court for the District of
Delaware misinterpret both the statutes and precedent, and ignore the market-based policy
underlying the Code.102
This Comment argues that courts may approve retention agreements with fee defense
provisions in compliance with Section 328 and Baker Botts, and that such provisions are
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560 U. S. 242, 252–53 (2010)).
99
See, Akinnibi, supra note 94; Jim Christie, Judge Rejects 'Fees on Fees' in Bankruptcy in Wake of Asarco, REUTERS
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100
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(Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015); Akinnibi, supra note 94.
101
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102
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imperative to maintaining a market-based bankruptcy system.103 By denying fees for successful
defense of fees, courts heighten the risk that bankruptcy attorneys’ fees will be diluted, and that
attorneys will be paid less than non-bankruptcy attorneys in comparable fields.104 Opposing
counsel will strategically object to fees knowing that the attorneys are in a “no-win” situation.105
Fee defense provisions under section 328 will guard bankruptcy professionals from fee dilution
and maintain a fair and just system through court oversight.106 Furthermore, while other solutions
have been proposed, such as raising fees in general or imposing sanctions on frivolous objections,
fee defense provisions are the only feasible option under the current bankruptcy system. 107
A. Fee Defense Provisions Under Section 328 Comply with Baker Botts
1. Baker Botts Does Not Effect Section 328
Section 328 is not subject to the Supreme Court’s ruling on section 330. The court’s ruling
in Baker Botts was strictly limited to section 330, and nowhere in the opinion was section 328
mentioned.108 Furthermore, because section 330 does not bind section 328, the opinion has no
control over contracts made under section 328.109 Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code
and the introduction of section 328, private payment agreements were not permissible.110 Since,
section 328 and section 330 have existed as separate methods of compensation.111 If a court
approves retention under section 328, fees may not be later altered under section 330 (absent

Stephen J. Lubben, Problems With the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Fees, supra note 86.
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LLC, 3-4, 36, 2014 WL 6845689 (U.S., 2014); Springer, supra, note 56 at 539; Lawyers React to Justices’ Ruling in
Baker Botts Fee Case, LAW360 (June 15, 2015 7:25 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/667772/lawyers-react-tojustices-ruling-in-baker-botts-fees-case.
105
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See infra § II D.
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110
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unforeseen circumstances).112 In fact, the language of section 330 directly states that it is subject
to section 328, and any mention that section 328 is bound to section 330 is absent from both
statutes.113
2. Court Approved Retainer Agreements Are Binding Contracts
Retainer agreements are contracts.114 However, the U.S. Trustee has argued that a retainer
agreement made under section 328 is not a contract because it is subject to court approval, and
therefore cannot serve as an exception to the American Rule.115 This is not accurate. Under section
328, an attorney may be employed, with court approval, “on any reasonable terms and conditions
of employment, including on a retainer.”116 By definition, a retainer agreement is a contract setting
forth the amount an attorney is to be paid for a certain period of time or certain tasks.117 In fact,
in recognizing section 328’s binding nature, courts, including the court in In Re Boomerang,118
have identified that court-approved retainer agreements remain contracts.119 In fact, there are other
circumstances under the Bankruptcy Code in which agreements may be unilaterally modified or
approved by courts while still remaining binding contracts.120 Similar to retainer agreements,
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113
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bankruptcy courts may alter collective bargaining agreements121 if modifications are found
necessary and appropriate under the balance of the equities.122
3. Contracts Under 328 Are Exceptions to the American Rule
Baker Botts holds that contracts are an exception to the American Rule,123 and if retainer
agreements are contracts, it naturally follows that they are an exception to the rule.124 Nevertheless,
the In Re Boomerang court held that a retainer agreement between counsel and the official
committee of creditors, despite being a valid contract, was not an exception to the American Rule
because it bound the estate, a third party, to pay.125 The court also asserted that a contract cannot
bind a non-signing third party.126
The Delaware bankruptcy court’s holding is weak for two reasons. The first issue is the
fact that it has one-sided implications. The estate, which is the entity that funds attorneys’ fees
and other expenses,127 is still able to contract with its counsel for fee defense provisions.128 It
would not comport with fairness to allow debtors to reimburse counsel for defense of fee
applications, but not creditors.129 Second, although a contract cannot bind a non-signing third
party, the court’s contention will not prohibit fee defense provisions in general; it will only cause
modifications.130 Given the fact that debtors and creditors alike have sought to include fees for
defense of fees provisions in their retainer agreements, the simple work-around this opinion is to
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have both parties agree to such contractual provision.131 As further support for the general
acceptance of fee provision, it should be noted that neither the creditors nor debtors have objected
to each others’ fee defense provisions, but it is rather the U.S. Trustee who has taken on this role.132
B. Maintaining a Market Based Bankruptcy Code: Fee Objections and the No-Win Situation
Under the U.S. Trustee’s interpretation of Baker Botts,133 bankruptcy professionals “are
now being asked to be the volunteer firefighters of the bankruptcy world. Debtors [and creditors]
will say, 'Please send the jaws of life, but staff it with volunteers.'”134 Increased fee objections and
the threat of such objections in negotiations will dilute fees by putting professionals in a no-win
situation: either defend their fees and eat the costs, or lower their fees to avoid litigation.135 Skilled
bankruptcy professionals will make the rational choice to work in other areas of law, and once
such skilled bankruptcy professionals have left the practice, the bankruptcy system and the market
in general will suffer the consequences.136 Highly successful bankruptcy cases would not exist
without the talented attorneys who coordinate such reorganizations.137
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Increased fee objections will dilute the fees of bankruptcy professionals.138 Bankruptcy
professional fees are frequently litigated,139 and if bankruptcy professionals receive no exceptions
to the American Rule, objections and any subsequent litigation will only increase.140 In a 2004
based study conducted by the American Bankruptcy Institute, parties objected to the lead debtor
attorney fees in 10% of chapter 11 cases.141 In large chapter 11 cases, party objections doubled to
20%.142 As will be discussed infra, bad faith sanctions such as Rule 9011 and § 1927 have little
to no deterrence on unmeritorious fee objections. Disgruntled creditors and debtors alike will use
this as an opportunity to commence scorched earth campaigns against professionals under the false
guise of good faith.143
Fee dilution is not limited to the bankruptcy profession and exceptions to the American
Rule have been commonly recognized in other areas of law as well.144 The Ninth Circuit, fearing
fee dilution for bankruptcy professionals, compared the situation to other statutorily authorized
fees.145 If an attorney is required to spend time litigating fee applications at self-cost, the attorney’s
effective rate for the hours spent on the case will shrink, and as a result attorneys will take less
cases with statutorily authorized fees, such as Title VII, civil rights cases, or bankruptcy cases. 146
In addition, the effective rate for bankruptcy professionals is at even greater risk than civil rights
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attorneys because a longer list of parties may object to bankruptcy fees. 147 The debtor, a trustee,
a creditor, an equity security holder, any indenture trustee, or any other party of interest may
contest a debtor or creditor’s attorney fees—or, in the case of Baker Botts, even a scorned parent
company that the law firm sued on behalf of the debtor.”148
The license to make threats of objections may be an even stronger source of fee dilution
that the objections themselves.149 The intimidation of the court’s oversight may sometimes hinder
bad faith or unmeritorious objections in court, but court oversight does not extend to objections in
negotiations.150 Robert Keach, co-chair of the Chapter 11 Reform Commission, explains that an
objector, such as ASARCO, can make a law firm, such as Baker Botts, “spend in excess of its
bonus to defend its bonus. It’s a powerful threat to make—whether it is from creditors or
debtors.”151 The power of the threats will come from their newfound credibility. 152 If an objection
is made, it is now more than likely that the bankruptcy professional will eat the cost of defending
the objection.153

As the District of Delaware court recognized, “‘creditors could negotiate

reductions in these fee awards knowing full well that the attorney is in a no-win situation. Even if
the attorney prevails, he or she will in effect have financed the litigation without any hope of
surviving it whole.’”154
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As Congress feared, if bankruptcy professionals are paid less than their non-bankruptcy
counterparts, there will be less incentive to engage in bankruptcy practice. 155 Currently, almost
every elite law firm has a bankruptcy practice.156 But there was a time, when bankruptcy
professionals were compensated based on the economy of the estate, “when bankruptcy law
practice was not well regarded and was considered by most firms as unseemly.” 157 Under such a
system, skilled attorneys had no interest in joining the bankruptcy practice because “no money
could be made without very hard labor, and it [was] only by volume of work that one may [have]
hope[d] to acquire a competence.”158 Bankruptcy was, and still is, a very complicated system, so
talented young attorneys will have little incentive to join such a difficult practice if they know they
will be more fairly compensated in another corporate area.159
“Compensation is the lubricant which makes the bankruptcy machinery work,”160 but if
bankruptcy professionals are not compensated at market rate, the machinery may no longer
work.161 Skilled bankruptcy professionals have benefited creditors and debtors alike by finding
ways to decrease losses to the estate, save jobs, and pay creditors.162 If bankruptcy is left to “those
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who could not find other work and those who practice bankruptcy only occasionally almost as a
public service,”163 the new rank of attorneys representing debtors and creditors may mistakenly
take action, or not take action, in such a way that is damning to the estate.164 Creditors will realize
that the likelihood of receiving recoveries from a bankrupt estate has dwindled, and will
consequently raise borrowing costs.165
C. Rejecting Alternatives: Why Section 328 Fee Defense Provisions Are Superior to Other
Options
The additional solutions have been proposed to fix the fee dilution problem: (1) Rule 9011
sanctions against offending attorneys, firms, or parties who bring an fee objection that is frivolous
or improper;166 (2) §1927 sanctions against attorneys for vexatious or improper conduct in bringing
a fee objection;167 and (3) fee padding.168 One may also argue that this is a problem best dealt with
by Congress, but given the current state of affairs, the reality of the situation has tapped the
judiciary with responsibility.169 The remainder of this Comment will analyze the three possible
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alternatives to section 328, and will prove that contractual provisions are the best-suited solution
for bankruptcy law.
1. Fee Padding
Some professionals have suggested that the proper way to counteract fee dilution caused
by meritless fees objections is to set attorneys fees at a higher price. 170 Aside from the fact that a
rate padding scheme would put the cost of meritless fee objections posed by the few on the whole,
such a scheme is not possible under the Code’s transparency requirements,171 current case law,172
or the U.S. Trustee Guidelines.173
Bankruptcy courts hold that “the hourly rates of bankruptcy practitioners must be
commensurate with the hourly rates charged by their peers in other practice areas.”174 If a firm
were to raise its hourly rate for bankruptcy work, then the bankruptcy court would compare such
fees to its work in non-bankruptcy proceedings, note that the bankruptcy rate is higher, and hold
that that the bankruptcy rate does not comply with the code.175 In addition, the U.S. Trustee does
not allow attorneys to engage in rate padding.176 Despite concerns regarding fee dilution, the U.S.
Trustee has maintained the guideline requirement that firms be paid the general hourly rate charged
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for non-bankruptcy proceedings.177

The bankruptcy system requires fee applications to be

transparent and detailed breakdowns of rates.178 If rates are padded, the system will be undermined
because attorneys cannot honestly account for the generally increased fees when the number of fee
defenses will vary from case to case.179
2. Rule 9011
The majority opinion in Bakers Botts suggests that Rule 9011, the bankruptcy version of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, will provide a sufficient deterrent against frivolous claims.180
Rule 9011 sanctions attorneys for bad faith litigation conduct, including attorney’s fees that
occurred as a result of the conduct.181 Rule 9011 may protect against frivolous objections in theory,
but in practicality, it will be an insufficient guard against fee dilution because it is rarely brought
up and executed.182
Rule 9011 is rarely used in bankruptcy courts, and even when raised, its standard is too
high to make any real impact on fee dilution.183 Courts demand “exceptional circumstances where
a claim is patently unmeritorious or frivolous”184 so that the “very temple of justice has been
defiled.”185 If courts must exercise “restraint” and “discretion” at the level the law demands,186
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even the list of meritless objections in Baker Botts would not meet such a criteria.187 Thus, the
patent bad faith necessary for rule 9011 sanctions will hardly meet most meritless fee objections.
The first case published since Baker Botts illustrates that Rule 9011 is a useless tool against
fee dilution. In In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC, the Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District
of Illinois determined that, despite a “scorched earth campaign” of objections against the fee
application,188 which was met to no avail both in the trial court and on appeal, 189 attorney fee
sanctions were not warranted.190 The court stated that “[t]he standards for bad faith are necessarily
stringent, and [a] party should not be penalized for maintaining an aggressive litigation posture.”191
The court furthermore reasoned that the objector “acted to protect its interests,” and given the fees
at stake, “did not commit a fraud upon the Court, nor did it defile the “very temple of justice.”192
It must be reminded that in large bankruptcy cases, fees will always come with a price because of
the case’s inherent size and complexity.193 Objectors will continue to object in self-interest,
whether it is by a scorched earth campaign or a justified pursuit, but it is in the interest of the
profession and estates to minimize fee dilution.194
In addition to objections by parties, fee applications are also subject to objections by the
court itself. In such instances, Rule 9011 provides no instrument to combat fee dilution at all.195
Take this hypothetical, proposed by former Bankruptcy Judges Clark and Fitzgerald, for example:
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Suppose the bankruptcy judge, acting sua sponte under Section 330(a)(2), flags a
perceived problem with the professional's fee application. The professional prepares a
response, at some nontrivial cost, and the bankruptcy judge is ultimately persuaded to
award fees as originally requested by the application. Nobody has done anything wrong
here. To the contrary, the process is precisely what the Bankruptcy Code requires . . . .
The bankruptcy judge certainly will not sanction himself, so . . . the professional [will be
forced] to bear the bankruptcy-specific cost of defending her successful application. That
cannot be right[.]196
Rule 9011, while an available tool, is not a sufficient solution to fee dilution on its own. If
it were, fee objections would increase given the lack of consequences imposed by rule 9011, and
attorneys would be disincentivized to practice in bankruptcy, leaving the estates to the lack of
skilled workforce from days past.197
3. Section 1927
It has been suggested that Section 1927 will provide a more adequate solution to the fee dilution
problem.198 However, Section 1927, just like Rule 9011, will not solve the fee dilution problem.
Section 1927 declares that any attorney who “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably
and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the . . . attorneys’ fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct.”199 While the statute would theoretically sanction attorneys fees
for “unreasonable and vexatious” objections, in practical application, the statute will not be
effective or even applicable to bankruptcy proceedings.200
The primary issue with Section 1927 is the fact that circuits are split on whether bankruptcy
courts may even impose the sanctions at all.201 Even if a bankruptcy court allows for 1927
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sanctions, the standard of persuasion is just as high, if not higher, than what is necessary for Rule
9011 sanctions.202 As the bankruptcy court reminded in In Re River, “[s]anctions, under any
authority, are the exception, not the norm, and should not be imposed lightly, ‘even in the face of
aggressive litigation tactics and strategy.’”203 In addition, scholars have suggested that the burden
of proof under 1927 is more demanding than the burden of proof under 9011(a). 204 In some
jurisdictions, such as the Second Circuit, sanctions are declined “absent both ‘clear evidence’ that
the challenged actions ‘are entirely without color, and [are taken] for reasons of harassment or
delay or for other improper purposes’” and “a high degree of specificity in the factual findings of
[the] lower courts.”205 Thus, Section 1927 is just as, if not more, unreliable and inefficient as a
tool against fee dilution as Rule 9011.
D. The Viable Option: Fee Defense Provisions Are Reasonable Under Section 328
Attorney Fee provisions are reasonable under 328, and should therefore be granted by
courts. The bankruptcy court of the District of Delaware and the Third Circuit have listed five
non-limiting factors to determine the reasonableness of terms and conditions under § 328: (1)
whether the terms of the retention agreement reflect normal business terms; (2) the relationship
between the debtors and the professionals; (3) whether the retention agreement is in the best
interest of the estate; (4) whether the creditor opposes the retention agreement; (5) the reasonability
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of the price and level of risk minimization.206 The fifth factor, reasonability of the price, can be
supplemented by the Johnson factors from section 330—most notably, “whether the compensation
is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners
in cases other than cases under this title.”207 This section will demonstrate why engagement
agreements granting compensation for successfully defending fee applications meet all five factors
of the Delaware test.
1. Defense Fees Are Part of the Normal Market Place
The provision would reflect normal business terms in the market place because it would
maintain the way the modern bankruptcy system has operated itself and would replicate accepted
practice in other fields of law. In the bankruptcy market, the majority of courts have allowed for
compensation for successful fee defenses.208 In fact, courts in nineteen states have awarded
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attorney’s fees for successfully defending fee applications.209 Furthermore, despite the fact that
328 provisions were not necessary for successful defense costs under section 330, some courts
approved such provisions regardless.210 Even outside of sections 330 and 328, courts have
awarded defense fees in debtor-in-possession financing orders.211 Even outside of bankruptcy law,
where attorneys are not subject to as much fee dilution, engagement agreements with provisions
contracting for similar attorneys fees have been approved. 212 Thus, fees for defense of fees
provision would reflect normal business terms both in and outside of bankruptcy.
2. Sophisticated Parties
The relationship between the debtors and professionals generally indicate that retention
agreements are reasonable because both parties to the agreements tend to be sophisticated with
equal bargaining power.213 This will be especially true in large Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in
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which creditors and debtors are sizeable and sophisticated organizations with their own in-house
counsel.214
3. Fee Defense Provisions Are in the Best Interest of Estates
The retention agreements will be in the best interest of estates under the same market based
policy reasoning the majority of courts maintained for section 330 prior to Baker Botts.215 While
it may be argued that Baker Botts eliminated any such policy arguments,216 Baker Botts was
decided based on the statutory text, which does not negate the importance of the market-based
approach.217 Similar to courts granting defense fees, retention agreements will minimize fee
dilution and will ensure that bankruptcy cases will be handled by skilled professionals, ultimately
protecting estates from higher costs.218 When professionals, without the security of defense fees,
face objections to their fee applications, they are put in a no-win situation for which there is no
viable solution.219 If professionals are not granted attorney’s fees for successfully defending fee
applications, there is a risk that attorney’s fees in general will rise, adding unnecessary costs to the
estate.220 If such costs do not rise, then the highly skilled professionals who make the system work
will not be compensated in parity with their non-bankruptcy counterparts.221 Bankruptcy attorneys
will be forced to join practice elsewhere, leaving the fate of the estate to volunteers and those who
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could not otherwise find employment.222 Ultimately, all parties will suffer from a lack of skilled
representation.223
4. Creditors Will Not Oppose the Provision
Creditor opposition will be of little issue in regards to defense fee provisions because
creditors are just as likely as debtors to apply for fee defense provisions.224 The effects of such
agreements are mutually beneficial for both parties, so it is unlikely that either parties’ defense fee
provisions will objected by anyone other than the U.S. Trustee or the court.225
5. Reasonable Fees with Built-In Risk Minimization
Lastly, the provision is reasonable and provides the correct level of risk minimization.
Under the Johnson Factors, it is the general policy of the Code to compensate attorneys in parity
with their non-bankruptcy counterparts. As discussed above, professionals’ fees will be diluted to
the point where they are compensated less than other attorneys in similar circumstances. Under
the pre-2015 bankruptcy system, which generally included defense fees, bankruptcy attorneys
were paid the same as, if not less than, other corporate attorneys.226 If fees are generally diluted,
then they, as a whole, will be paid even less. As demonstrated above, Rule 9011 and Section 1927
are inadequate barriers to fee dilution, and fee padding is impermissible under the law. The fee
defense provisions are further reasonable because of court oversight, which mitigates the risk of
attorneys filing frivolous fee requests under the expectation that they will be objected to, adding
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up defense fees to charge the estate.227 Courts have the power to modify the terms of the agreement
and limit fees to successful defenses and reasonable amounts.228
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